Spurred on by a couple conversations I had with friends yesterday, my thoughts turned philosophical, and I asked a question which I have since had great difficulty answering: What am I?

The obvious answer is my name, David. So I imagined myself, and thought, "There, that is me." But then I realized that I was in fact the observer of my imaginary self, and not the conjured object, so that answer seemed unsatisfactory. So then I thought, "I am a physical process; I am a wonder of chemistry and electricity." But this just seemed a more fancy and complicated version of the first answer; again the observer being me, and not the nuanced device which I imagined. So I then thought, "I am the observer." But in this case, to explain the problem illustratively, I imagined an eye viewing an eye, which to be to viewed had to require an eye viewing the eye viewing the eye; and so an endless loop results with an infinitely increasing number of eyes, and no viewpoint upon the actual observer.

It turns out, if I am not mistaken, it is impossible to define or observe "I".

So now, my next question is, "If I can not define myself as an object, can I define you as an object?"

I think you could, given the case. In this case, it would be an eye viewing another eye.

There is no I. Only seeing.
There is no you. Only being.
:p

Yes, following your logic you should be able to. The original problem was that you were attempting to observe yourself; as you should be able to observe me (were we to meet), then you should be able to define me as an object.

The problem isn't really with being unable to define yourself- the difficulty is that you then attempt to observe it, which is unecessary when attempting a definition.

I am what all I can see isn't.

I am what is left after all I can define has been removed.

No, the problem is that you attempt to observe yourself directly. Observation is neccessary for true understanding, but it need not be direct. You are the eye viewing an eye, yes, but that eye is you, viewed through the mirror of the real world. You observe yourself through what you do, how you act and react, both physically and psychologically, what you cause, what you prevent, when you succeed, when you fail, etc.

In this method, you can define yourself as 'I', 'I' being the collected processes, experiences, and motives you have observed in yourself. This definition becomes more exact and accurate as you observe more of yourself, it is also updated, as you undoubtably change with time. The same process can be used to define others, only the 'mirror' of the real world is not neccessary. It is, however, still useful to see these people 'from a different angle', i.e. through the mirror. As with the definition of yourself, your definition of others will become more exact and accurate as more observations are made, and it will also be updated as others will change with time just as you do.

Ah, I don't know how I missed this before! I just had to write an essay on something very similar to this. Presents on point of view on this topic (sort of), more or less saying you can't be defined as an object, but it's the memories that make you who you are.

Personal Identity is the means and ability by which people are able to distinguish others apart. It is the ability to recognise the person standing before you as the same one you spoke to last night. It is the means by which you know that the person you are meeting for lunch is really who they claim to be. And perhaps most importantly, it is the means of knowing who you are; knowing that you are the same person when you wake up as when you went to sleep. “When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure… that it is that very thing, and not another which at that same time exists in another place… and in this consists identity”.

But how do we know that this identity exists? What defines a person? This essay will argue that personal identity is derived from memory. First the base criterion will be put forward and explained. Arguments will then be presented against this criterion, trying to find faults with it. Revisions to the original criterion will need to be made as the previous ones are broken down. Through this process – that is, arguments been presented against the criteria followed by revisions where needed – by the end of the essay, not only will it be possible to answer such questions as whether or not immortality is possible, but more importantly it will be shown that memory is an acceptable means for determining personal identity.

The original basis for defining personal identity as a collection of memories, comes from the ability to know who oneself is even with ones eyes closed. Imagine a person waking up in the morning, let’s call him Gary. Before opening his eyes, he knows who he is. It is not necessary for Gary to get up and look in the mirror before discovering that he is indeed himself. Nor must he take a look at his ‘soul’ to realise that he is indeed the same person who went to sleep. This presents the base for the memory criteria to built upon – Memory Criterion 1. Person X at Time 1 is the same as Person Y at Time 2 if, and only if, Person Y remembers the thoughts and actions of Person X. Using the same example, this would mean that Gary is the morning (let Gary in the morning be Gary 1) is the same Gary who went to sleep (let Gary in the previous night be Gary 2) if, and only if, Gary 1 can remember the same thoughts and actions as Gary 2.

A clear counterargument may be made by the general understanding that memories of events or actions may be formed in any number of ways, only one of which is through direct experience. Identity requires perceiving a difference in actually remembering something and seeming to remember something. It is possible to ‘remember’ events or actions through hypnosis, mental illness or even just from constant repetition of a story until it takes a form of a real memory. As an example, take a situation where a person, Gary, is in a room having certain thoughts and experiencing certain actions. Another person, Robert, is in the next door room been hypnotised. Upon awakening, they remember having the same experience as Gary had while he was in the other room – the thoughts, the actions and so on. At a later stage, both Gary and Robert claim to remember sitting in that room and remember experiencing the same thoughts, yet only Gary actually experienced them. This shows that remembering an event does not equate to actually experiencing the said event.

A revised criterion is needed; one which removes the possibility of memories been faked by hypnosis, mental illness or other such methods – Memory Criterion 2. Person X at Time 1 is the same person as Person Y at Time 2 if, and only if, Person Y remembers the experiences of Person X and actually had those experiences. This new criterion gets over the previous problem by stating that these memories must be caused by the person having the experience. So Robert is not Gary because his memories were not caused by sitting in the room where Gary was. This new criterion leads to a circularity trap. Person X is Person Y if they actually have the experiences of Person Y. This is saying that Person X is Person Y if they are Person X. Due to this failure, the criterion must once again be revised.

To get around this latest argument, the Memory Criteria will need to be revised again, to give us Memory Criterion 3. Person X at Time 1 is the same as Person Y at Time 2 if, and only if: (1) Person Y seems to remember the thoughts and actions of Person X; and (2) Person Y’s apparent memories were caused in the correct way. The ‘correct way’ can be defined as any reliable method of information storage, including the storage of memory in the mind after the occurrence of the event. This criterion now makes no mention of who had the experiences, only how they were stored, and therefore avoids the circularity trap. It also still solves the problem presented with the first criterion; namely that ‘memory’ could be caused through hypnosis, mental illness or other ways that did not involve actually having the experience. Take the former example with Robert been hypnotised. In this case his ‘memories’ were not caused in the right way. They were not caused by the experience itself, followed by the brain storing the information in form of a memory; whereas Gary’s memories were caused by the experience (i.e. in the right way). This revised criterion seems to solve the current arguments against using memory as a means of personal identification.

At first glance, such a criterion also allows a possibility of immortality, through an afterlife. The criterion states that the memory must be caused in the correct way, yet does not specifically define what the correct way is. To narrow it down, the correct way must be a reliable method of storing the information. In the example presented in the previous paragraph, this reliable method is by storage in the brain after the experience. But another possible reliable method is storage by an omnipotent divine being (e.g. A monotheistic god) then transported to a new brain. This makes it possible to have an afterlife - and therefore immortality – as upon death, God is able to pluck the memories from the dead body and place them inside a new brain in an afterlife, hence giving the possibility of immortality.

This approach brings up a problem with regards to the transitivity of identity. The transitivity of identity is a logical principle that states if A = B and B = C, then A = C. This principle can be used to deduce different faces – for example, if it is known that the Morning Star is Venus and the Evening Star is the same thing as the morning star, it is acceptable to conclude that the Evening Star is Venus. Likewise, using Gary again as an example, if Gary at Time 1 is the same as Gary at Time 2 and Gary at Time 2 is the same as Gary at Time 3, and then we can conclude that Gary at Time 1 is the same as Gary at Time 3. As an omnipotent being, God is able to, upon death, put the memories of Gary into more than one mind, effectively creating two Gary’s in the afterlife. This would mean that Gary 1 at Time 1 would be the same as Gary 2 at Time 2, and the same as Gary 3 at Time 2; leading to the conclusion that Gary 2 at Time 2 is identical to Gary 3 at Time 2. As it is impossible to have two duplicates of one thing while remaining quantitatively identical this approach becomes impossible should we wish for immortality, the criterion will need to be revised for now.

To get around this problem, a revision to the criterion will have to be made in order to remove the possibility of there been more than one of a person at the same time – Memory Criterion 4. Person X at Time 1 is the same as Person Y at Time 2 if, and only if: (1) Person Y seems to remember the thoughts and actions of Person X; (2) Person Y’s seeming to remember is caused in the correct way; and (3) no other being can meet condition (1) and (2). This means that if God were to create two copies of Gary’s memory, neither would be Gary. But this new criterion allows a new argument to be raised against it.

This new criterion makes it possible for absurd situations, where people can blink in and out of existence. Expanding on the above example, Gary 1 has died and God has created Gary 2 and Gary 3, each with the same memories that Gary 1 had upon death. Because there are two beings that can both be considered Gary by meeting condition (1) and (2), they do not meet condition (3) of the criterion and therefore Gary no longer exists. Should God have a change of mind and destroy one, Gary suddenly pops back into existence. This fluctuating existence is absurd – for Gary to be able to switch between existence and non-existence constantly is irrational and due to this reason it is necessary to rule out this version of the Memory Criterion as a means of determining personal identity.

Because of the problems with the memory criteria presented in the above three paragraphs, the possibility of immortality and an afterlife will be dismissed for the Memory Criteria. With this dismissal in mind, it is necessary to revisit Memory Criterion 3, which was previously dismissed because it could not offer immortality. Memory Criterion 3 stated that Person X at Time 1 is the same as Person Y at Time 2 if, and only if: (1) Person Y seems to remember the thoughts and actions of Person X; and (2) Person Y’s apparent memories were caused in the correct way. The contradictions arose here when the ‘correct way’ of memories resulted from either by the brain storing the memory after the experience or an omnipotent divine being putting the memories into storage. To get around this, it is necessary to narrow down the definition of the ‘correct way’, by removing the possibility of God storing such memories, before putting them in a new mind (in an afterlife). If such a method is considered an unreliable method of information storage, then Memory Criterion 3 is not rejected.

Given the main arguments presented against the Memory Criteria, it can be seen that Memory Criterion 3 holds up against them. It can separate memories caused by an actual experience from those which merely seem to have been caused by the experience. It has neither major contradictions nor absurdities involved in it. There is no problem with the transitivity of identity or a circularity problem in the argument. To arrive at a conclusion about the criteria of personal identity, it has been necessary to reject the possibility of immortality. Given all the arguments above, it can be concluded that Memory Criterion 3 is an acceptable criterion for personal identity.

Blarrgh! Rotku thank's for wasting 10 minutes of my life! :(

I am Simon James Croft. Human, male of various mixed ethnicities (a right bastard some of you would call me... knowing my ethnic origins or not). I am me and me is I.

I look down and see my hand and that is a part of me. I needn't imagine myself since I know I am here by observing the rest of my body. Indeed I can not see my own face without assistance of a mirror but I know it's there even though I have never viewed it directly.

Since I deem anything I see in this world as real then I also have to be real since I can see myself. I interact and things react to my own actions, therefore according to the world I am real.

What am I? I am the being that is communicating to you now.

Well, I think the conundrum has been settled adequately already, so I'll just inject a little funny a la George Carlin:

No one can accurately know how they look in a pair of sunglasses.;)

Blarrgh! Rotku thank's for wasting 10 minutes of my life!*laughs*
I thought me saying it was an essay I wrote was a big enough warning.

What am I?A bored man in the middle of the night? :shake:

Wb, btw. :p :D

As one of my friends defined it with me in mind:

Dum bibo spiro. :D